Ever since the Federalist Papers, there has been a common view that the lower the level of government, the greater is the extent of capture by vested interests. Relying on the analytical framework of relative capture, I challenge this view by arguing that interest groups have different incentives and capacities to capture different levels of government. I test the theory by investigating how judges at different judicial levels adjudicate corporate lawsuits in China. Exploiting a quasi-experiment in which the Supreme People's Court dramatically raised the threshold for entering higher-level courts in 2008, I report evidence that while privately owned enterprises are more likely to win in lower-level courts, state-owned enterprises are more likely to win in higher-level courts. These results are robust to a variety of tests, including considering selection bias, firms' political connections, and using different samples. The findings challenge an underlying assumption in the decentralization literature and have important policy implications for countries that are trapped in centralization/decentralization cycles.
Going back to Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, and John Jay in the Federalist Papers (No.10), a common view is that the lower the level of government, the greater is the extent of capture by vested interests. 1 Empirical work finds that granting more autonomy to local governments facilitates elite capture of political processes, creating a company town atmosphere in which regulations and policies are designed to protect the regulated businesses. 2 Some recent work shows that decentralized systems are more corrupt and have weaker law enforcement than centralized systems, and others find that centralization has significant effects on eliminating elite corruption at the local level and generating better group outcomes. 3 A sizable literature on local capture collects evidence from countries that decentralized their political and fiscal systems during economic reforms, such as China and Vietnam. For example, Lorentzen, Landry, and Yasuda show that large industrial firms in China prevent local governments from implementing environmental transparency, and that this local capture appears strongest when the city's largest firm is in a highly polluting industry. 4 In a recent article, Mattingly argues that local elites in China use their influence to capture rents and confiscate property. He shows that inclusion of lineage leaders in village political institutions weakens villagers' land rights. 5 On Vietnam, Malesky, Nguyen, and Tran demonstrate that Vietnam's reform to centralize administrative and fiscal authority has significantly reduced elite corruption and improved public service delivery. 6 A presumption made by these studies is that the extent of capture will linearly decrease as one moves up the political hierarchy assuming that politicians at higher levels keep an arm'slength relationship with interest groups. However, their empirical evidence has mostly focused on one level of government and analyzed what set of actors capture that one level.
The literature has generated significant policy implications. Aware of the danger of local capture, these countries have started to centralize their political systems in order to correct 1 Hamilton, Madison and Jay 1961. 2 Reinikka and Svensson 2004; Campos and Hellman 2005; Malesky and Taussig 2009; van der Kamp, Lorentzen and Mattingly 2016. 3 Treisman 2000; Goldsmith 1999; Cai and Treisman 2004; Grossman and Baldassarri 2012; Malesky, Nguyen and Tran 2014. 4 Lorentzen, Landry and Yasuda 2014. 5 Mattingly 2016. 6 Malesky, Nguyen and Tran 2014.
"local protectionism." For example, the Chinese Communist Party announced a "rule-of-law" reform package in 2014 to centralize the political and fiscal management of the judicial system, which has been blamed for protecting local vested interests. 7 In the same vein, the National Assembly in Vietnam introduced the Ordinance on Judges and Jurors of People's Courts in 2002 to "centralize the management of the lower courts" to higher-level courts. 8 I challenge the underlying assumption in this literature by arguing that capture exists at every level, and that capturers are different at different levels. Inspired by Bardhan and Mookherjee, I extend the analytical framework of relative capture to argue that interest groups have different incentives and capacities in influencing different levels of government. 9 Due to political (for example, electoral institutions) and economic (for example, tax structures) constraints, different levels of government are susceptible to distinct interest groups. For example, a higherlevel government's reliance on a certain type of interest group for tax revenue might strengthen that group's incentive and capacity of higher capture, while a lower-level government's fiscal dependence on another type of interest group might create a tendency for lower capture. The relative capture framework does not make the linear assumption that the lower the level of government, the greater is the extent of capture. Rather, it claims that various levels of government are relatively captured by various interest groups.
Contrary to previous studies that focus on only one level of government, I examine how capture works at multiple levels. In my empirical analysis, I examine how judges at different judicial levels adjudicate corporate lawsuits in China. China has one of the largest decentralized political systems in the world, and its judiciary represents a typical decentralized system in which fiscal, administrative, and political power has been granted to local authorities. 10 A close examination of how Chinese judges at different levels handle cases brought by different firms provides important insights into how a decentralized system functions and how various interest groups operate. The subject of my study-courts-is an important contracting institution that provides the legal framework to protect private contracts, and the quality of legal institutions 7 Please see http://goo.gl/QmBk4m (Accessed February 23, 2015) . 8 Please see https://www.bhba.org/index.php/component/content/article/251 (Accessed February 23, 2015) . 9 Bardhan and Mookherjee 2000. 10 Landry 2008a; Falleti 2010. is highly correlated with a country's long-term economic development, protection of human rights, and quality of government. 11 Taking advantage of China's fragmented bureaucratic structure, in which the judiciary must answer to the territorial party-state (horizontal authority) rather than a higher-level court (vertical authority), I am able to study how the linkages between litigants and a particular level of party-state influence judges' decisions. Importantly, Chinese judges' incentive structure is shaped by the local government tax system. While the Chinese tax system allocates a bigger percentage of private firms' tax payments to county governments (which control basic people's courts), state-owned enterprises (SOEs) are the major revenue sources for municipal governments (which control intermediate people's courts). This fragmentation between the horizontal and vertical lines in the political hierarchy creates different opportunities and incentives for judges and firms at different levels. I therefore expect that privately owned firms are more likely to win in lower-level courts (basic people's courts), and that SOEs are more likely to win in higher-level courts (intermediate people's courts).
Rigorously testing relative capture would require a counterfactual in which the same interest group is treated at different levels in the judiciary. However, this counterfactual does not exist in the real world, and corporate lawsuits handled by lower-level courts are systematically different from those adjudicated by higher-level courts. For example, higher-level courts are responsible for disputes with higher financial stakes.
I exploit a quasi-experiment in which the Chinese Supreme People's Court dramatically raised the threshold for entering higher-level courts in 2008 to examine how firms are treated differently at different levels. For example, before 2008, economic disputes with claims higher than 6 million yuan (roughly $920,000) were under the jurisdiction of intermediate people's courts, and cases less than this amount were under the jurisdiction of basic people's courts. This cutoff point was raised to 50 million yuan (roughly $7.7 million) in 2008. This jurisdictional change shifted a large number of cases between 6 million and 50 million yuan (treatment group) that should have been adjudicated by intermediate people's courts before 2008 to basic people's courts after 2008. This policy change therefore creates exogenous variations in firms' exposure 11 North 1981; La Porta et al. 1997; La Porta et al. 1999; Acemoglu and Johnson 2005; Simmons 2009. to different levels of the judiciary.
Compiling and analyzing a novel dataset of over 4,000 court cases disclosed by publicly traded firms from 1998 to 2013, I report strong evidence supporting the relative capture framework. On average, SOEs' win rate is estimated to be 30% higher in intermediate people's courts than in basic people's courts, while non-SOEs' win rate is 40% higher in basic people's courts than in intermediate people's courts.
The findings have important implications for many developing countries that struggle to strike a balance between the private and public sectors. SOEs have been described as a major interest group that is responsible for obstructing economic reforms, bending regulations, and causing many developmental problems, such as pollution and corruption. 12 A prevailing remedy for the sins of SOEs is privatization, which has been championed by the World Bank and encapsulated in the Washington Consensus. 13 This view rests on the assumption that state capture will be reduced (or even eliminated) when resources are transferred to the private sector.
However, as I show, SOEs and private firms can both capture the state, given certain incentive structures in the political system. Privatization would only shift capture from one level to another.
To my knowledge, this is the first quasi-experimental evidence on whether and how different interest groups capture governments at different levels. My findings directly challenge an implicit assumption made by a large literature that the lower the level of government, the greater is the extent of capture by vested interests.
This article also speaks to the literature on the rule of law in authoritarian regimes and contributes to the scarce but growing literature on comparative judicial politics. 14 This the first article to demonstrate that judges do rule in a biased fashion over business disputes in a country without judicial independence, in order to protect firms that party authorities want to protect. This is qualified or nuanced, however, by the finding that local authorities protect firms only if they contribute revenues to the local coffers. 12 Haggard 1990; Hellman, Jones and Kaufmann 2003; Dasgupta et al. 2001 . 13 Lieberman 1993 . 14 Helmke 2002 Moustafa 2007; Ginsburg and Moustafa 2008; Ferejohn, Rosenbluth and Shipan 2009; Wang 2015. Relative Capture and the Chinese Judiciary Following Hellman, Jones, and Kaufmann, I define capture as firms using their influence to shape the formulation of the rules of the game or how games are played (with or without private payments to public officials and politicians). 15 Bardhan and Mookherjee develop a framework of relative capture based on a model of electoral competition subject to the influence of special interest groups. 16 In their basic setup, two parties whose policy platforms are influenced by campaign contributions from a lobby representing the interests of an elite are competing.
Voters vary in their socio-economic status, political awareness, and party loyalty. There is an asymmetry in political participation across different classes: rich and informed voters participate at a higher level than poor and uninformed voters. The model then generates conditions under which capture is more likely to occur at the local or higher levels. One condition relates to interest groups' incentives and capacity to influence elections at different levels. For example, when the electoral process is based on a majoritarian system in which only the dominant party wins and gets represented in national policy-making (as opposed to a system of proportional representation), politicians rely more on campaign contributions to win, and interest groups have higher stakes in the election, which creates a tendency toward greater capture at the national level.
The model is not directly applicable to an authoritarian context, such as China. However, its intuition that politicians and interest groups have different incentives and capacities at different levels is useful for understanding relative capture in a non-democracy. For example, if politicians at different levels are dependent on different interest groups for tax revenue (as opposed to campaign funding as in Bardhan and Mookherjee's model), then this might make politicians at different levels vulnerable to different interest groups. Below, I briefly introduce China's judicial system and discuss how the relative capture framework can explain judges' incentives in the judicial hierarchy.
The Chinese judiciary is embedded in a fragmented and decentralized political system in which government organizations at different levels (and in different hierarchies) usually have 15 Hellman, Jones and Kaufmann 2000. 16 Bardhan and Mookherjee 2000. conflicting policy goals. 17 This "fragmented authoritarianism" is reflected in the judiciary's design, in which a court is the agent of dual principals. The first (vertical) principal is the higher-level court. Although there is a national four-level judicial hierarchy from the Supreme People's Court at the very top to basic people's courts at the lowest level (Figure 1) , the institutional design does not require lower-level courts to obey orders from higher-level courts. 18 For example, the Supreme People's Court cannot independently appoint presidents or other major court officials at the provincial level; nor is the Supreme People's Court responsible for financing lower-level courts. 19 While judges in the U.S. judicial system often reverse decisions made by lower-level courts, which has a deterrent effect on lower-level courts' behavior, 20 higherlevel courts in China rarely amend lower-level courts' decisions, although they have the power to do so. 21 As an intermediate people's court judge remarked, "We do our best to respect basic people's courts' decisions. We do not correct if it is a borderline case unless there is a fatal mistake." 22 Higher-level courts, however, do participate in evaluating lower-level courts and making personnel decisions, but this power is limited.
The second (horizontal) principal is the party-state at the same territorial level. The judiciary in China is treated as a functional department under the authority of the party-state. The party-state at each level, including the Chinese Communist Party committees and the executive branch, takes a leading role in making personnel decisions and budgetary allocations for courts at that territorial level. 23 For example, the county party committee and government have the prerogative to appoint presidents and other major court officials at basic people's courts, and pay the majority of basic people's courts' expenditures, including judges' salaries and bonuses, office supplies, vehicles, and court buildings. So the policy preferences of courts are more responsive to those of the corresponding party-state than the higher-level court. 17 Lieberthal 1992; Mertha 2009. 18 Wang 2015, 76-79 . The decentralized legal system was designed to prevent politicians from using the legal system for political purges, which were prevalent in the early years of the Chinese Communist Party. Please see Tanner and Green 2007. 19 Wang 2015, 68-70. 20 Kastellec 2011. 21 Basic people's courts and intermediate people's courts serve as first-instance courts for most cases, and a litigant can appeal once to a higher-level court. The decision by the higher-level court is the final verdict. 22 Author's interview with a judge, March 31, 2010. 23 Wang 2015, 76-77.
[INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE]
To understand the policy preferences of Chinese judges, we therefore need to examine the incentive structure of Chinese party-state officials. It has been shown that the priority of local Chinese officials is to maximize tax revenues, which is a strong predictor of their promotions. 24
According to the current fiscal system, the Chinese central government and local governments share the tax revenues. While some corporate and value-added tax (but no sales tax) is collected by the central state, the rest is collected by various levels of local government. 25 In the current tax 27 The case is collected from my qualitative interviews, so the names of the company, the locality, and interviewees remain anonymous to protect the interviewees, but transcripts of these interviews are available upon request. 28 Author's interview with a lawyer, March 29, 2010. court delayed the process and tried to convince the plaintiffs to settle the dispute outside the court through mediation. The plaintiffs refused. The court finally had to hold court hearings, and the final verdict was made by the court adjudication committee (an ad hoc committee that consists of major officials of the court rather than a panel of judges). The court ruled that Great Ocean won, but to discourage the stockholders from appealing, Great Ocean needed to pay a lump sum of compensation to the plaintiffs, although the amount was lower than what the plaintiffs originally claimed. Lawyer Wang commented, "Chinese local government only intervenes in individual cases if 1) one of the parties has a special identity, for example if a government official or an influential firm is involved, or 2) if the case outcome can impact social stability." 29 A judge said, "Here in this place, there is a saying: 'No matter if it is a black firm or a white firm; as long as it pays taxes, it is a good firm.'" 30
The case illustrates that tax incentives are a major driving force behind courts' decisions.
As agents of their territorial party-state, we would expect intermediate people's courts to favor SOEs and basic people's courts to protect non-SOEs. And because higher-level courts usually defer to lower-level courts' decisions, we should expect courts to sincerely reveal their policy preferences through their judicial decisions. Hypothesis 1 summarizes this theoretical expectation:
Hypothesis 1: While SOEs are more likely to win in intermediate people's courts, non-SOEs are more likely to win in basic people's courts, ceteris paribus.
EMPIRICS
There are two empirical challenges to comparing win rates at different levels in an authoritarian state. First, unlike studies of the U.S. federal judicial system that can utilize widely published cases, 31 the judiciary in authoritarian regimes is often one of the most opaque sectors in the political system, so no systematic dataset of court cases is available. Most studies of legal behavior have relied on survey measures of litigants' preference for courts or whether disputants 29 Author's interview with a lawyer, March 29, 2010. 30 Author's interview with a judge, April 8, 2010. 31 Sunstein et al. 2006. chose to go to courts. 32 Very few empirical studies have been able to systematically examine court outcomes in authoritarian regimes, especially at the local level. 33 Second, because of the heterogeneity of cases across different judicial levels, simply regressing case outcomes on the judicial level could produce biased estimates. For example, cases adjudicated by higher-and lower-level courts are systematically different. A conventional regression framework often fails to control for unobservable firm-and court-level characteristics, which could produce omitted variable bias. In addition, litigants can self-select into a certain level of court to obtain a more desirable outcome, which could produce selection bias.
Data
I use a unique, manually coded dataset of firm litigations disclosed by Chinese publicly traded firms from 1998 to 2013 to conduct this study. In 1998, the Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchange issued a rule that required listed companies to disclose their involvement in litigations. 34 This mandatory disclosure requirement covers all lawsuits that involved publicly traded firms since 1998. I manually collected 4,275 court litigations from company reports (annual, semiannual, quarterly, and special) and constructed the Chinese Listed Firms' Litigation Dataset (CLFLD). 35 The CLFLD contains information about each case's legal issue, type, litigants, claim (in yuan), outcome, timing, court name and level, and others. The vast majority of cases in the CLFLD are economic disputes. I then merged the CLFLD with another dataset that contains firm-level variables, such as state ownership, registration location, age, total assets, and industry. These variables are collected from the China Securities Market and Account Research (CSMAR) database. 36 This article is the first empirical study to use CLFLD to examine judicial outcomes at different levels. 37 Because only the discloser is publicly traded and, therefore, publicizes firm information, we know little about its competitor in the litigation unless it is also publicly traded. For 636 unique pairs, I am able to find information on both sides of the litigation; 36.64% of these pairs are SOEs versus non-SOEs, 49.37% are SOEs versus SOEs, and 13.99% non-SOEs versus non-SOEs. For the main analysis, I use all 4,275 observations to leverage statistical power, assuming that the quasi-experiment assigned competitors into treatment and control at random. I will also show that when I focus on the subset of 636 cases, the results are similar.
In total, 1,034 cases (24.64%) were adjudicated by basic people's courts, 2,689 cases 
Identification Strategy
To obtain an unbiased estimate of the effect of judicial hierarchy on judicial outcomes, I exploit Figure 2 ). I call these cases Treatment Group I, because they were exposed to the treatment of basic people's courts after 2008. This is reflected in Figure 2 in which there are very few circles (basic people's court cases) in Cell 3 but more circles in Cell 4. The jurisdictional change also created control groups. 6.52), so the DID is 23.32% (s.d. = 8.24, p < 0.01), indicating that non-SOEs are more likely to win in basic people's courts. The remainder of this article will elaborate on this strategy to produce more convincing results. 40 38 Card and Krueger 1992; Lemieux and Card 2001; Duflo 2001. 39 The ownership data are from CSMAR and the Chinese Economic Censuses of 2004 and 2008. Specifically, a firm is coded as an SOE if its ultimate shareholder is the government, including any departments in the government, such as the Bureau of State Asset Management or the Finance Bureau. This coding rule is consistent with prior studies, please see Wang, Wong and Xia 2008. 40 An alternative identification strategy is a regression discontinuity (RD) design to compare cases just above and just below the cutoff point. The success of an RD design relies on the assumption that there is no sorting around the cutoff point (Imbens and Lemieux, 2008, 632) . If firms manipulated the claim numbers to self-select into a certain level of court, anticipating a higher win rate, the no-manipulation assumption of the RD design is violated. Since I conduct a McCrary density test (McCrary, 2008) , which rejects the null hypothesis of continuity of the density of dispute claims around the cutoff points, I do not use an RD design. For results of the McCrary density test, please see Section III in the web appendix.
Difference-in-Difference Estimates
To exploit the variation in treatment across cases and time periods, this strategy can be generalized to a regression framework. First, I conduct an intention-to-treat analysis to estimate the reduced-form relationship between being in the treatment group after 2008 and a firm's win rate. 41 The intention-to-treat analysis focuses on the groups created by the randomization introduced by the 2008 jurisdictional change, although in reality the randomization was not strictly enforced. As Dunning argues, intention-to-treat analysis may produce inaccurate estimates of the effect of the treatment (for instance, if many subjects in the assigned-to-treatment group did not actually receive the treatment), but analyses of natural experimental data should almost always present intention-to-treat analysis. 42 This suggests running the following regression:
where W in i is a binary variable indicating whether the firm that announced the case won, c 1 is a constant, P ost2008 i is an indicator for cases accepted after 2008, T reatment Group I i is an indicator for cases that had claims within the Treatment Group I range, X is a vector of covariates that might not be balanced pre-and post-treatment, α 1k denotes province dummies and θ 1d industry dummies. γ 3 is the DID estimator, and I expect that γ 3 < 0 for regressions using SOEs and γ 3 > 0 for those using non-SOEs.
All models include the following controls. Assets (log) is the natural log-transformed total 41 Dunning 2012, 138. 42 Dunning 2012, 138. assets of the firm, Age is the age of the firm, and prior studies show that bigger and older firms are more likely to go to court. 43 Contract Dispute is an indicator for contract disputes (as apposed to loan cases, tort cases, or other cases). Prior studies have shown differential win rates across case types, with more predictability among contract cases in which both parties can observe the contractual terms and relevant actions. 44 Finally, a large literature on the Chinese legal system has been focused on "local protectionism," in which courts usually favor locally based litigants. 45 The CLFLD includes information about firms' registration locations and courts' locations. Because two firms are involved in a dispute, there are four possible scenarios:
1) the announcing firm and the court share the same location (at the municipal level), and the other firm is registered in a different location (I code this as Home (10.37% of cases)); 2) the other firm and the court share the same location, and the announcing firm is registered in a different location (I code this as Road (14.18% of cases)); 3) none of the firms share the same location with the court, so the court is a third party (I code this as Third (4.14% of cases)); or 4) both firms share the same location with the court (I code this as Derby (71.30% of cases)). bility of winning. Firm size (measured by Assets (log)) and age (measured by Age) help firms win, which is consistent with prior findings. 47 SOEs are more likely to win contract disputes in which two parties have symmetric information. 48 Surprisingly, I find no "home-field advantage" for SOEs; they have roughly the same win rates in all four scenarios (Home, Road, Third, and Derby). I interpret this as a result of SOEs' broad political connections that are not limited to one locality. Future research can examine how SOEs employ political connections outside jurisdictional boundaries to gain leverage in courts.
For non-SOEs, however, more exposure to basic people's courts significantly increases their probability of winning. Firm size and age have negative signs and are not statistically significant. Similar to SOEs, non-SOEs are more likely to win contract disputes. Lastly, there is a significant "home-field advantage" for non-SOEs: they are less likely to win in "road" courts than in "home" courts because they usually only have local ties that do not cross boundaries.
The intention-to-treat analysis results are largely consistent with Hypothesis 1: SOEs are more likely to win in intermediate people's courts, while non-SOEs are more likely to win in basic people's courts. However, an unbiased estimate of the local average treatment effect (LATE) requires full compliance. As Table 1 indicates, although most cases ended up in the right court based on the amount of their claims, a small number of cases went to the "wrong" courts. This might be the result of unobservable case/firm/court characteristics (such as the case's political sensitivity or court burden) or simply mistakes. In addition, because only listed firms' information is publicly available, if one of the firms involved in the dispute is not public, that firm's information is unobservable to the researcher. To more accurately estimate the LATE, I use an instrumental variable (IV) estimator, which is elaborated in the next section.
Two-Stage Least-Squares Estimates
Because a case's claim amount and timing jointly determine its probability of being adjudicated by a basic people's court, I can use an interaction term between dummy variables indicating a case's designated group (treatment or control) and acceptance year to predict the probability 47 Ang and Jia 2014. 48 Kessler, Meites and Miller 1996; Shavell 1996; Siegelman and Waldfogel 1999; Lu, Pan and Zhang 2015. that it will be accepted by a basic people's court, and then I can use this probability to predict the likelihood that it will win. If we assume that the interaction term has no effect on the probability of winning other than by changing the court level (exclusion restriction), one can use the interaction term to conduct IV estimates of the effect of judicial level on judicial outcomes.
To meet this exclusion restriction assumption, I need to assume that the 2008 regulatory change assigned cases to treatment or control groups at random or at least as-if random. Below, I show evidence and provide reasoning on why the identification strategy is valid.
First of all, if the regulatory change indeed randomized cases into basic (treatment) and intermediate (control) people's courts after 2008, we should observe a perfect balance of covariates in these two groups. I find exactly that. As Table 3 presents, all of the covariates, including Assets (log), Age, Contract Dispute, Home, Road, Third, and Derby, are not significantly different in treatment and control at the 95% confidence level.
[INSERT TABLE 3 HERE]
In addition, one scenario that could potentially violate the exclusion restriction assumption is if firms strategically self-selected into one group or another in anticipation of the jurisdic- Under the assumption that the interaction between cases' designated group and timing has no direct effect on their probability of winning, the interaction term is available as a valid instrument for the treatment. This strategy, an IV estimator, has been used in other similar situations. 50 This instrument has been shown to have good explanatory power in the first stage, which is presented in the lower panel in Table 4 . 51 The first stage yields large F statistics ranging from 161.27 to 223.17, which far exceeds the standard critical value of 10 required to avoid weak instrument bias. 52 I use two-stage least squares (2SLS) to fit the following equation:
where Basic i is a binary variable indicating whether the case was adjudicated by a basic people's court (intermediate people's court as the reference group), and it is instrumented by P ost2008 i × T reatment Group I i . γ 1 is the quantity of interest-the LATE of basic people's courts-and I expect that γ 1 < 0 for regressions using SOEs and γ 1 > 0 for those using non-SOEs. 49 For more details, please see http://news.xinhuanet.com/legal/2008-01/28/content_ 7509567.htm (Accessed February 19, 2015) . 50 Card and Krueger 1992; Lemieux and Card 2001; Duflo 2001. 51 Section V in the web appendix presents the full results of the first stage. 52 Staiger and Stock 1997.
[INSERT TABLE 4 HERE]
The upper panel of Table 4 shows the second-stage results, which are largely consistent with the DID estimates. Similarly, I do not find a "home-field advantage" for SOEs. Conversely, basic people's courts significantly increase non-SOEs' probability of winning. However, firm size and age do not seem to matter for non-SOEs. They are more likely to win contract disputes, and there is a significant "home" effect for non-SOEs: they are more likely to win at home than on the road.
So far, I have only included variables measuring one side of the litigation (the discloser)
without considering its competitor, under the assumption that the 2008 policy change also randomized the competitors into treatment and control. The evidence above indicates that private firms are more likely to win in lower-level courts regardless of whether their opponents are private or state owned. Below, I provide direct evidence that even facing an SOE, a private enterprise is more likely to win in lower-level courts. Unfortunately, not every firm on the other side is publicly traded and, therefore, releases its ownership information. For 636 unique pairs of firms that are both listed, I am able to collect ownership information on both sides. Below, I restrict my analysis to litigations between a non-SOE and an SOE. My theory predicts that non-SOEs are more likely to win against SOEs in basic people's courts than in intermediate people's courts. Table 5 shows the IV estimates with Basic instrumented by P ost2008×T reatment Group I. Again, both province and industry fixed effects are included, and I cluster standard errors at the provincial level.
[INSERT Table 4 , indicating that the 2008 change indeed randomized competitors into control and treatment groups. This provides the strongest, direct evidence to support my theory.
In sum, both the DID and 2SLS results support Hypothesis 1 that there is relative capture in the Chinese judicial hierarchy: while SOEs are more likely to win in intermediate people's courts, non-SOEs are more likely to win in basic people's courts. I now turn to three potential sources that could bias my estimates.
Robustness Checks
I conduct three checks to test the robustness of the results against potential sources of bias.
First, because cases will enter CLFLD only if firms have chosen to go to court, my analysis does not include firms that settled their disputes outside the courts, such as through arbitration or mediation (alternative dispute resolution). This could create a selection bias if, for instance, SOEs are more likely to win because they are more likely to go to court in the first place when they have a dispute. Prior studies have indeed shown that SOEs, because of a higher expected win rate, are more likely to litigate than non-SOEs. 53 A similar selection bias is presented in the discussion of how to estimate the treatment effect of signing international treaties on countries' compliance behavior: because compliant countries are more likely to sign these treaties in the first place, simply regressing compliance on treaties could introduce significant selection bias. 54
A conventional solution to selection bias is to adapt a Heckman selection model to first predict firms' likelihood to litigate and then use this likelihood to predict their win rate. 55 
Discussion and Conclusion
As Rodden remarks, "[o] ther than transitions to democracy, decentralization and the spread of federalism are perhaps the most important trends in governance around the world over the last 50 years." 64 By the end of the 20th century, estimates of the number of decentralization reforms had ranged from 80% of the world's countries to effectively all of them. 65 My study helps reconcile this controversy. I argue that the framework of relative capture is useful in examining politicians' and interest groups' incentives at different levels of government. The key insight is that a political hierarchy can be relatively captured by different interest groups at different levels. I then use a novel dataset of real court cases disclosed by Chinese publicly traded firms to show that cases brought by different firms win at different rates at different levels of the judiciary. I argue that the Chinese local governments' tax incentives shape the preferences of local judges: courts are more likely to favor firms that provide a major source of revenue to the party-state at the same territorial level. Exploiting a quasi-experiment in which the Supreme People's Court in China dramatically raised the monetary threshold for cases to enter higher-level courts, which created exogenous variation in cases' exposure to var-ious levels of courts, I use an IV strategy to estimate the treatment effect of judicial level on judicial outcomes. I report strong evidence that while SOEs are more likely to win in intermediate people's courts, non-SOEs are more likely to win in basic people's courts. The results are robust to corrections of selection bias using genetic matching, considering firms' political connections, and excluding centrally controlled SOEs.
These points lead to an important policy implication. Politicians and policy makers who want to reduce capture in their countries should carefully examine the relative strength of major interest groups vis-á-vis different levels of government. In countries where the level of economic development is low and most interest groups are small and local, centralization is often effective in reducing local corruption and improving governance. Indeed, Gennaioli and Rainer find that African countries that are more centralized have a better record of public goods provision, such as education, health, and infrastructure. 72 Conversely, in countries where the economy is more developed and diverse with firms of different sizes, a balance between local autonomy and central control is crucial to avoid capture. For example, many scholars, while comparing the reform experiences of China and Russia, argue that China's transition has been more successful because the Chinese Communist Party has been in a strong position to control its local agents while still preserving local autonomy, while in Russia old and inefficient firms benefit from preferential treatment by regional politicians whose power is not constrained by central authorities. 73 In these more diverse economies, emphasizing decentralization without central control often leads to "local protectionism," while too much centralization creates "higher-level protectionism." An important question for many developing countries that are facing this conundrum is to ask "captured by whom" and design solutions to fit local conditions. 72 Gennaioli and Rainer 2007. 73 
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Cell 2 Cell 6 Figure 2 . Assets (log) is the natural log-transformed total assets of a firm. Age is the firm's age. Contract Dispute indicates contract disputes.
Road is an indicator that equals 1 if the other firm and the court share the same location, and the announcing firm is registered in a different location. Third is an indicator that equals 1 if none of the firms share the same location with the court, so the court is a third party. Derby is an indicator that equals 1 if both firms share the same location with the court. All specifications include provincial and industry fixed effects. Standard errors clustered at the provincial level are presented in the parentheses. p-values are based on a two-tailed test: * p < 10%, * * p < 5%, * * * p < 1%. Road is an indicator that equals 1 if the other firm and the court share the same location, and the announcing firm is registered in a different location. Third is an indicator that equals 1 if none of the firms share the same location with the court, so the court is a third party. Derby is an indicator that equals 1 if both firms share the same location with the court. In the lower panel, the dependent variable is Basic. Controls include Assets (log), Age, Contract Dispute, Road, Third, and Derby. All specifications include provincial and industry fixed effects. Standard errors clustered at the provincial level are presented in the parentheses. p-values are based on a two-tailed test: * p < 10%, * * p < 5%, * * * p < 1%. Road is an indicator that equals 1 if the other firm and the court share the same location, and the announcing firm is registered in a different location. Third is an indicator that equals 1 if none of the firms share the same location with the court, so the court is a third party. Derby is an indicator that equals 1 if both firms share the same location with the court. The specification includes provincial and industry fixed effects. Standard errors clustered at the provincial level are presented in the parentheses. p-values are based on a two-tailed test: * p < 10%, * * p < 5%, * * * p < 1%. 
